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Abstract The theory of neoclassical welfare economics largely shaped international and
national agricultural policies during the Cold War period. It treated technology as an ex-
ogenous factor that could boost agricultural productivity but not necessarily sustainable
agriculture. New growth theory, the economic theory of the new knowledge economy,
treats technological change as endogenous and argues that intangible assets such as hu-
man capital and knowledge are the drivers of sustainable economic development. In this
context, the combined use of agricultural biotechnology and information technology has
ag r e a tp o t e n t i a l ,n o tj u s tt ob o o s te c o n o m i cg r o w t hb u ta l s ot oe m p o w e rp e o p l ei nd e -
veloping countries and improve the sustainable management of natural resources. This
article outlines the major ideas behind new growth theory and explains why agricultural
economists and agricultural policy-makers still tend to stick to old welfare economics. Fi-
n a l l y ,t h ea r t i c l eu s e st h ec a s eo ft h eC a s s a v aB i o t e c h n o l o g yN e t w o r k( C B N )t oi l l u s t r a t e
an example of how new growth theory can be applied in the ﬁght against poverty. CBN is
a successful interdisciplinary crop research network that makes use of the new knowledge
economy to produce new goods that empower the poor and improve the productivity
and nutritional quality of cassava. It shows that the potential beneﬁts of agricultural
biotechnology go far beyond the already known productivity increases and pesticide use
reductions of existing GM crops.
Keywords Agricultural biotechnology · Cassava · Developing countries · Empowerment ·
Knowledge economy · New growth theory
1
New Growth Theory and the True Value of Technological Change
Most economists today are still trained in neoclassical economics. Its basic
comparative–static assumptions of perfect competition, knowledge as a pure
public good, and price-setting as market failure were very popular in the
twentieth century because they enabled elegant formalizations of general and
partial equilibrium models from the household economy to the world econ-
omy. This neoclassical approach is based on the assumption that all goods
and technologies that could possibly exist, do already exist. This philoso-
phy of plentitude [1] proves to be particularly inadequate in a knowledge
economy where the exponential growth of knowledge leads to an exponen-
tial growth of the probability that new goods and technologies come into
being and generate new markets. This process is not just the primary source
of wealth and prosperity but also generates a social welfare surplus that
cannot be captured by the innovating company itself. Paul Romer, the fa-
ther of new growth theory, was able to highlight the social welfare impact
of new goods within the neoclassical economic model [2]. In that article
“new goods” primarily refer to capital goods that are used as an input for
the improvement of the production of already existing commercial goods or
the creation of entirely new goods (e.g., products derived from agricultural
biotechnology are new goods that improve the quantity and quality of agri-
cultural production).Agricultural Biotechnology and the Knowledge Economy 71
1.1
Explaining the Knowledge Economy
New growth theory emerged in the 1990s in response to the inadequate as-
sumptions of neoclassical theory. In his paper, “Endogenous technological
change” Paul Romer (1990) showed that knowledge, unlike other production
factors such as land, labor, and capital, is a non-rival good that can be used
by many at the same time without loss in value. Thanks to the revolution in
information technology, this knowledge can be reproduced at almost no addi-
tional costs. Yet, the creation of new knowledge is expensive since it requires
large ﬁxed costs spent on research and development (R&D). These costs also
include the hiring of scarce and expensive human capital, the most sought-
after resource in the knowledge economy [3]. It is therefore not surprising
that those who create new knowledge want to make its use partially exclud-
able through intellectual property rights (IPRs). This temporary monopoly
right allows the owning company to extract a rent by putting the price of
the new knowledge-intensive product above its marginal production costs. It
thus enables the company to compensate for the high ﬁxed costs that were
spent on R&D, and, at the same time, provides incentives to invest again in
improvement of the product.
1.2
Monopolistic Competition as the Primary Source
of the Creation of New Goods
It is therefore monopolistic competition and not perfect competition (as por-
trayed in the idealized neoclassical theory) that creates new goods and new
markets. The company that introduces a new good has the temporary power
of setting the price of this good in the market (unlike companies in perfect
competition, which are all assumed to be price-takers). Neoclassical welfare
economists often denounce price-setting power as the extraction of an un-
deserved rent by a monopolist at the expense of the consumers, who suffer
a deadweight loss due to the higher price they have to pay for the prod-
uct. Even though empirical research by economists themselves showed that
these deadweight losses are quite small [4], policy makers tended to iden-
tify monopolistic competition as market failure that needs to be addressed
by government intervention. This thinking is, however, based on two con-
tested assumptions: (i) knowledge is a non-excludable public good funded
by governments and produced at public universities and national research
institutes and (ii) monopolies exist primarily because they repress compe-
tition through high barriers to market entry generated through collusion
and political lobbying.
These two assumptions are not wrong but they are not the whole truth.
Governments indeed fund the production of knowledge and make sure that it72 P. Aerni
is widely accessible. But, only the private sector can convert new knowledge
into successful markets for new goods, technologies and services, and this
conversion also requires a fair amount of investment in R&D. Moreover, the
decision to invest in a new technology is particularly risky and expensive due
to high R&D costs and a high degree of unpredictability with respect to the
estimated demand, the length of the approval process, social acceptance, and
potential liability costs. Therefore, a company will only invest in a new tech-
nology if there is a prospect of making a considerable proﬁt. Such a proﬁt is
possible if a company can obtain a temporary monopoly right through the
protection of its intellectual property (the temporary right to exclude others
from copying and selling the same product). This makes the non-rival good
partially excludable. Yet, such a monopoly is not just extracting a rent from
consumers through a higher price but also creates a new good that produces
a social welfare surplus, which cannot be captured by the company itself (e.g.,
more employment, more tax revenues, more knowledge in the public realm
through patent disclosure, economic spillovers leading to generic products
that are also affordable to poorer consumers/producers, etc). Thus the more
useful knowledge that is generated in society the higher the likelihood that
new goods will be created. Therefore, this new knowledge economy is no
longer about substituting one existing good for another existing good but
about the constant introduction of new goods.
1.3
Social Welfare Generated by New Goods
The social welfare that results from the introduction of a new good is not new
but was already noted by a French engineer called Dupuit in the nineteenth
century [2]. He calculated the cost of building a bridge and the minimal toll
the users of the bridge need to pay to reimburse the ﬁxed costs for building
the bridge. He was able to show that the entrepreneur who builds the bridge
is constrained in his efforts to extract a maximal rent from the users, because
if the toll is too high the user might simply not use the bridge (assuming that
the users are acting in a competitive world with scarce resources themselves).
He therefore concluded that the entrepreneur can never capture all the ben-
eﬁts of building the new good “bridge”. The same is true for a company that
wants to develop a new technology. Instead of extracting an additional rent
through a toll (as in the case of a physical good), it would do it through a roy-
alty fee on the patented technology.
1.4
Adding a Dynamic Dimension to Welfare Economics
The creation of new goods that emerge from monopolistic competition can
be illustrated by means of simpliﬁed version of a partial equilibrium modelAgricultural Biotechnology and the Knowledge Economy 73
Fig.1 The welfare surplus generated by the introduction of a new good, according to
Romer [2]
adopted fromRomer [2] (see Fig. 1). It represents a partial equilibrium model
withthe x-axis referring totheamount ofproductionofgoodZ and they-axis
the price per unit charged by the company. The marginal cost of production
indicates any additional cost required to produce a next unit. This marginal
cost curve is ﬂat rather than increasing because it only represents the variable
costs of production (below the line) that are assumed to remain constant with
increasing production in view of the low and relatively stable reproduction
costs of an innovation. The price is higher than the marginal production cost
because the company aims at reimbursing the high ﬁxed costs spent on the
development of good Z (not represented in the marginal cost of production)
and making proﬁts that allow for further investment in R&D.
Neoclassical economists interpret this graph as a typical case of a mar-
ket that is dominated by a monopolist: there is only one producer of good Z,
who has the power to determine the scale of production and set the prod-
uct price in a way that maximizes the expected returns (the sloping demand
curve illustrates how the price increases with decreasing output). In order
to illustrate the monopolist rent, the neoclassical economist would point at
rectangle B, which represents the surplus the monopolist extracts through
market power, and also triangle C, which represents the deadweight loss for
consumers who have to pay a higher price for the good. However, if this mo-
nopolist has obtained his position not through collusion but the investment
in the development of a new good, an additional social welfare surplus, trian-
gle A, comes into being. This triangle has been ignored by economists prior
to Romer. It represents the social welfare surplus that is generated throughthe
new good. The monopolist cannot capture this triangle because if, as Dupuit
already recognized, he raises the price above this level, he would lose the mar-74 P. Aerni
k e t( t h ep r i c ew o u l db et o oh i g hf o rp o t e n t i a lb u y e r st h a ta r ec o n s t r a i n e db y
their own competitive markets).
Romer concludes that if economistsbecame aware of this triangle A (which
he also calls the Dupuit triangle), they would realize that the primary source
of wealth and well-being in society is not based on perfect competition but
on the introduction of new goods and technologies. New technologies may
create new inequalities and risks at the beginning, when only few have ac-
cess to the relatively expensive technological innovation and accidents may
happen due to lack of experience with the new technology. But in the long
run many new competitors enter into the market, increase the total offer, con-
stantly improve the safety of the technology, and lower the price. Eventually,
the product becomes cheaper and safer and thus generates a global mass mar-
ket. At this stage, it could also become a tool of empowerment for the people
who previously lacked access to the technology [5].
1.5
Role of Multinationals in Economic Growth
Currently, the main players in the global mass market are multinational com-
panies. They are interested in selling their goods in all parts of the world. It
is true that their product must be sold at a much lower price in developing
countries with low purchasing power, but the fact that they have price-setting
power allows them to exert price discrimination. They can charge higher
prices in developed countries and lower prices in developing countries. More-
over, poor developing countries may be high-risk markets but they generally
offer greater long-term growth potential. There are certainly multination-
als that tend to abuse the system by charging prohibitive prices in certain
countries, aggressively push the strict enforcement of their patents and later
on their extension, lobby for permissive regulation, and use the returns to
enrich themselves rather than invest them in new R&D. However, it can be
assumed that those companies may eventually lose out in competition be-
cause they had spent their scarceﬁnancial resourcesonpreserving short-term
political and market power instead of investing them in R&D to ensures the
long-term survival of the company in a competitive and innovation-driven
market.
1.6
Responsibility of National Governments
Whether a multinational company decides not just to sell but also to develop
and produce a new good in a particular country, depends to a great extent on
national government policies. National governments can discourage such in-
vestment by imposing high proﬁt taxes, trade restrictions on essential capital
goods, prohibitive safety regulation, and inefﬁcient and burdensome govern-Agricultural Biotechnology and the Knowledge Economy 75
ment bureaucracies. Corruption and weak property rights can additionally
increase the costs for the company until the point is reached where a com-
pany decides not to invest anymore in a developing country, despite cheap
labor and abundant natural resources, because the increasing costsexceed the
additional revenues expected through the higher price they intend to charge
(see Fig. 1). So the good will simply not be produced, which means that the
respective country loses the social welfare beneﬁts of the Dupuit triangle.
Instead of just taxing and regulating companies and pushing up the bar
of their marginal costs of production, governments can also serve as facili-
tators and encourage investment through tax exemptions for R&D, political
stability, a valuable stock of domestic human capital, dependable public in-
frastructure, and a relatively open and well-developed ﬁnancial market (that
improves the possibility of hedging risks).
In this context, governments in developed countries have many means
available to facilitate private sector investment. This allows them on the other
hand to increase the cost of regulation of a company (e.g., by pushing up
environmental and food safety standards). Poor countries, however, are in
a different position: because the market is tiny and the state budget too small
to improve investment conditions, additional regulations quickly erase the
proﬁts that foreign companies can expect. This again leads to the loss of the
Dupuit triangles, which are much larger than the deadweight loss triangles
for consumers (triangle C). Paul Romer [2] therefore concludes that “badly
designed policy interventions do not come from their effects on the static
allocation of resources between the activities in an economy that already ex-
ists. Rather, they come from the stiﬂing effect that the distortions have on the
adoption of new technologies, the provision of new types of services, the ex-
ploitation of new productive activities, and on imports of new types of capital
goods and produced inputs”.
2
How to Use Knowledge and Technology for Development?
As illustrated above, the primary contribution of companies to general social
welfare may not occur throughgeneral taxes (as widely assumed) but through
the generation of new goods and services. Yet, the problem is how to get the
private sector to produce valuable goods for markets that are too small to be
worth investing in? Often these markets are not served because of generally
low purchasing power or small market size.
This is a serious problem because the Dupuit welfare triangles for such
goods would be huge. For example, orphan crops with higher productivity
and enriched nutritional quality (e.g., protein-enriched cassava) or orphan
drugs against communicable diseases (e.g., Malaria vaccine) have the poten-
tial to improve public health in developing countries enormously. Old welfare76 P. Aerni
economics would suggest that the insufﬁcient production of such goods is
a typical example of market failure.
New growth theory, in turn, would argue that it is state failure because
governments fail to design appropriate incentives for the private sector to col-
laborate with universities in efforts to create new goods or improve existing
goods that are of high value in the ﬁght against poverty and for improvement
of the natural environment.
Since neoclassical welfare economics shaped agricultural and development
policies in the twentieth century and continues to do so, it is important to
ﬁrst understand the achievements, but also the unintended side effects, of this
comparative–static approach during the Cold War.
3
Cold War Economics and its Impact on Agricultural Policy and Research
The rise of neoclassical welfare economics began after World War II. At that
time, Western policy decision-makers were not just concerned about eco-
nomic growth (which was strong anyway due to the reconstruction efforts)
b u ta l s oa b o u tt h ei d e o l o g i c a lm i n d s e to fi t sc i t i z e n s .I tw a sa s s u m e dt h a te c o -
nomic development may result in increased social inequality and that this
might cause public disillusion with capitalism and a longing for communism.
Welfare economics was regarded as the ideal instrument to identify the aggre-
gated preferences of a society (in terms of expected social outcomes) and to
design policies that addressed such preferences (e.g., minimal social inequal-
ity). These aggregated preferences were portrayed in the form of a normative
social welfare function. Subsequently, positive analysis was applied to maxi-
mize allocative efﬁciency of the public policy measures designed to achieve
the resulting social objectives. The celebration of the elegant formal language
of general and partial equilibrium models in welfare economics and the be-
lief that the public sector must assume the role of a rational social planner
that addresses the problem of market failure inﬂuenced many areas of public
policy.
Yet, the great welfare economists at that time Paul Samuleson, Kenneth Ar-
row, and Robert Solow were too quick in identifying market failure when it
came to the management of public goods. Samuleson [6] used the example of
t h el i g h t h o u s et oi l l u s t r a t et h en a t u r eo fap u b l i cg o o d .H ea r g u e dt h a ts i n c e
none of the shippers would be willing to build such a lighthouse (in view of
the others who would just free-ride) it must be a public good that is based
on non-rivalry and non-excludability and therefore should be provided by
the public sector. Ronald Coase showed that this argument does not corres-
pond to historical facts: lighthouses that were ﬁnanced by user fees paid by
the shippers existed in Europe in the eighteenth century, as he pointed out in
his 1979 publication [7].Agricultural Biotechnology and the Knowledge Economy 77
Kenneth Arrow [8] and other welfare economists portrayed the state as
a rational social planner that looks at aggregate social preferences and, ac-
cordingly, allocates the scarce public resources in a pareto-optimal way (mak-
ing at least someone better off without making anyone worse off). Buchanan
and Tullock [9] discovered the ﬂaws in such assumptions by highlighting the
fact that the democratic decision-making process is not a rational process on
an aggregated level as Arrow assumes. Political actors pursue their own self-
interest and are not driven by the desire to maximize socialwelfare. Moreover,
there is no such thing as a rational social planner unless it refers to an all-
knowing dictator.
Finally, Robert Solow [10] managed to combine conventional growth the-
ory with neoclassical welfare economics. He argued that knowledge must be
funded by the public sector because it is a public good (assuming that it is
non-rival and non-excludable). As a result, technological change was treated
as an exogenous factor that can be perfectly integrated into the neoclassi-
cal model of perfect competition, where companies are portrayed as passive
price-takers. Romer ﬁnally challenged Solow’s growth model with his paper
on endogenous technological change [11]. He showed that it is not perfect
competition but monopolistic competition that generates new goods and ser-
vices. Moreover, his model was able show that companies also have to invest
in R&D (something the Solowmodel did not account for. A more detailed dis-
cussion of the theoretical aspects of new growth theory and the knowledge
economy has been published by Aerni in the ATDF Journal [12]).
4
Entrenched Interestsin the Post-Cold War Economic Community
In view of all these developments, one would therefore assume that eco-
nomics has evolved by accepting this shift in paradigm. However, textbook
economics continues to be welfare economics and technology is still largely
treated as exogenous. Those economists who deal with issues such as tech-
nological innovation and monopolistic competition are generally advised to
leave the economics departments and to join business schools [13]. This on-
going reluctance to embrace the new paradigm may also be related to the
entrenched interests within the academic community of economists. It high-
lights once again the contradiction that is so obvious in social science. On
the one hand, most social scientists claim to respect Popper’s concept of fal-
siﬁcation, but then who is really eager to falsify the theory that he or she
helped create? Unlike in the natural sciences, where an increasing gap be-
tween theory and experimental outcome leads eventually to an adjustment
of the theory, there is no such pressure in the social sciences. Most theories
that history has proved wrong or inadequate are still taught at universities
and continue to expand in the form of insider research communities. These78 P. Aerni
research communities have their own peer review process, which relies on re-
viewers from the inner circle of professors that are in charge of maintaining
the dogmas of the theory and have an interest in keeping the theory alive [14].
4.1
The Mindset of Agricultural Economists and How it Influenced
Agricultural Policy and the Green Revolution
The ﬁrst wave of globalization in the second half of the nineteenth century
led to a rapid decrease of transportation costs and erased many of the ge-
ographical barriers that previously protected local agriculture from foreign
competition. This threatened the livelihoods of many farmers in the early
stage of industrialization and governments started to be concerned about the
capability of their respective countries to ensure the national food supply
in times of war [15]. Political and economic (later also social and environ-
mental) instabilities were identiﬁed as negative external effects that need to
be addressed by the public sector [16]. At the outset, state intervention was
mainly justiﬁed in the name of managing the public good called “national
food security”. Agricultural economists were hired as social planners to en-
sure the effective management of this public good. The planning models they
used at a later stage (e.g., linear programming) to calculate how certain nor-
matively set policy objectives can be achieved most effectively, were largely
developed by scientists in the former Soviet Union. Even though these pol-
icy planners quickly realized that a democracy is not about the joint effort
to design a rational policy but about the self-interested search for access to
scarce public resources, it did not hinder them from sticking to the principles
of welfare economics and ignoring the role of political economy.
4.2
Agricultural Policy During the Cold War
Agricultural economics embraced the theoretical concept of the so-called
agricultural treadmill developed by Cochrane [17]. In this concept, farmers
produce a homogenous (presuming that there are no differences in quality)
and inferior (because of its low income elasticity: the higher the income the
lower the share of the household budget for food) commodity in the form
of food. They are portrayed as passive price-takers in a market of perfect
competition. The role of technology is reduced to its potential to increase
agricultural productivity (while its potential to improve food quality is not
addressed). Since farmers are standing in perfect competition they are as-
sumed to produce at the level where their marginal costs just equal their
marginal revenues. According to the concept of the agricultural treadmill, it
is possible that certain farmers adopt a new technology that allows them to
lower their production costs and produce more efﬁciently. This gives themAgricultural Biotechnology and the Knowledge Economy 79
a temporal advantage and thus a windfall proﬁt. Yet, this advantage is quickly
erased because all the competitors will have to follow suit if they want to stay
in business.
The agricultural treadmill is portrayed as the main reason for the surplus
in food production and the decrease in relative food prices. Unsurprisingly,
agricultural economists concluded that the treadmill, and with it techno-
logical innovation, largely beneﬁts food consumers at the expense of food
producers. They argued that the agricultural treadmill produces a sort of
market failure since farmers get poorer even though they produce more, due
to the inferior prices. Moreover, the resulting intensiﬁcation of agriculture
will destroy the environment and family farming and negatively affect the
quality of food. Yet, in retrospect, even agricultural economists would admit
that it was probably not the agricultural treadmill, but the market-distorting
instruments of agricultural policies that provided the biggest incentives to
adopt monoculture practices and degrade the environment and food qual-
ity. One only needs to go and watch the movie We feed the world,p r o d u c e d
by Erwin Wagenhofer in 2005 (the most successful Austrian documentary
movie ever) to get a picture of the unappealing endless number of green-
houses in southern Spain that focus almost exclusively on intensive tomato
production. Erwin Wagenhofer, who is an urban dweller with little know-
ledge of agricultural policy, blames the corporate world for all this misery.
Yet, in fact intensive tomato production in Spain is a result of EU subsidies.
The same goes for olive tree monoculture in Spain and Greece, overﬁshing
in the Atlantic Ocean, excessive growing of low-quality wine in France, and
many other subsidized products. All these practices are not just harming the
environment but they also discourage innovation and tend to make foodqual-
ity worse – for why should these producers care about innovation or pleasing
consumer taste if the money comes from Brussels anyway?
4.3
Agricultural Policy After the Cold War
In the 1990s, agricultural economists admitted that certain policies produced
“suboptimal” results despite the rational social planning. They recommended
a switch from production-tied subsidies to income-support subsidies. The
new objective was the maintenance of a strong, healthy, and environmen-
tally sustainable agricultural sector. As a consequence, things like agro-
biodiversity, food safety, decentralized settlement, and custodianship to cul-
tural landscapes were declared to be the new public goods that are provided
by farmers – after the old public good of maintaining food security became
somewhat obsolete in view of the production surplus and the end of the Cold
War. It provided the best justiﬁcation to keep agricultural economists em-
ployed as social planners and continued to use all the old planning models
that arefocused oncreating optimal allocativedistribution inareas where the80 P. Aerni
market presumably fails to do so. But did the market really fail or are these
bureaucrats increasingly managing state failure?
There is increasing evidence that the new agricultural policies and the
new justiﬁcations for government intervention in agriculture did not bring
the expected improvements: Direct payments were designed to mitigate the
structural change that was expected to result from slightly more open agri-
cultural markets, as demanded by the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).
Yet, direct payments proved to be an obstacle to structural change because
they increased the value of land and discouraged many farmers from becom-
ing more innovative and competitive. At the same time, the new normative
goals of agricultural policy to promote environmental, social, and economic
sustainability through compliance schemes (e.g., agro-environmental mea-
sures/labeling schemes in return for more direct payments and premium
prices) once again turned out to be in the best tradition of government-
sponsoredagriculturaleconomicresearch,namelysuboptimal.Environmental
improvements were relatively meagre and largely achieved through more ef-
ﬁcient input technologies. Moreover, a large evaluation of agro-environment
measures in Europe showed that such measures hardly ever contribute to an
increase in valuable biodiversity [18]. There also seems to be a correlation be-
tween the amount of direct payments a rural region receives and its economic
decline [19]. This is not surprising in view of the fact that a high dependence
on direct payments is not an attractive way of life for the young people so they
lookforopportunitieselsewheretoparticipateinthenewknowledgeeconomy.
A partfromthis,theprivatesectorisreluctanttoinvestinheavilysubsidizedre-
gionsbecauseofthereceivermentalityofthepeopleandhighproductioncosts
(pushed up indirectly throughdirect payments).
In spite of the timid opening of agricultural markets, agricultural trade
has hardly increased over the past two decades. One major reason for that
is the WTO AoA itself. It is primarily focused on a gradual improvement
of market access rather than the reduction of domestic support measures.
But, ultimately, it is domestic support measures that result in wrong mar-
ket signals, overproduction, and subsequent market access restrictions [20].
The fatal consequence was that the amount of domestic support did not de-
crease but was just moved from so-called “actionable” subsidies (placed in
the amber box of the AoA to “non-actionable” subsidies (placed in the blue
and green box of the AoA). In WTO terminology, subsidies are identiﬁed by
“boxes” which are given the colors of trafﬁc lights: green (permitted), am-
ber (slow down – i.e., to be reduced), red (forbidden). Export subsidies are
prohibited and therefore fall into the red box. This is, however, not strictly ap-
plied in agriculture where export subsidizes are still tolerated. The amber box
contains all trade-distorting domestic support measures. Any support that
w o u l dn o r m a l l yb ei nt h ea m b e rb o x ,i sp l a c e di nt h eb l u eb o xi ft h es u p p o r t
also requires farmers to limit production. Green box subsidies are meant to
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It was assumed that non-actionable subsidies would not be trade-
d i s t o r t i n gb u ti tt u r n so u tt h a tt h e ya r e .A ta n yr a t e ,t h i ss h i f tk e p ts o c i a l
planners employed and did not force anyone to look at theory. But are these
policies sustainable and do they really beneﬁt farmers? In consideration of
what we now know, the answer is unlikely to be yes. A parallel development
with a similar ambiguous outcome happened in the international arena where
the primary concern was to develop new agricultural technologies to enable
developing countries to become self-sufﬁcient in food production.
4.4
Theoretical Thinking Behind the Green Revolution
The same agricultural economists who argued in the 1940s that the West-
ern states needed to maintain a healthy agricultural sector through subsidies
and border protection argued that developing countries must be assisted in
the development of new varieties and modern irrigation systems in order
to boost food production and avoid hunger and starvation. It was assumed
that the private sector would have no interest in investing in technologies
that would serve poor farmers in developing countries. Therefore, public in-
vestment in international agricultural R&D was declared to be a public good
that must be managed by the public sector (following the Solow model). The
resulting global public sector initiative is today widely known as the Green
Revolution. It was to a large extent a US-driven effort to improve food se-
curity in the non-aligned developing world as part of a global containment
strategy against communism [21]. The United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID) and the Rockefeller Foundation were the main
ﬁnancial contributors to the establishment of the ﬁrst Centers of the Consul-
tative Group of International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) in developing
countries. These CGIAR centers enabled Western scientists to work in well-
equipped research centers in developing countries and design high-yielding
varieties ofmajor foodcropssuchasmaize, wheat,andrice. Thenewvarieties
were subsequently distributed in rural areas through government agencies.
The private sector was hardly involved, even though it later beneﬁted from
the scientiﬁc knowledge generated through this international undertaking.
The research at these centers (CGIARs) contributed to signiﬁcant increases
in agricultural productivity and technology transfer to local universities and
national research institutes in developing countries.
4.5
International Agricultural Research During the Cold War
There is no doubt that the Green Revolution greatly contributed to global
food security through the excellent international agricultural research that
was conducted at CGIAR centers during the Cold War. However, the interac-82 P. Aerni
tion between Western scientists, who developed high yielding varieties, and
local farmers in developing countries who adopted these varieties through
the national seed distribution programs, was rather poor. This led to some
long-term problems such as inadequate use of pesticides, insufﬁcient opera-
tion and maintenance of irrigation systems, little seed choice for farmers, and
monoculture practices [22]. In addition, farmers in marginal regions did not
beneﬁt to the same extent from these new hybrid varieties that were mainly
designed for favorable agricultural conditions with access to fertile soil, irri-
gation, markets, and essential inputs [23].
Left-wing development activists point at these unintended side effects of
the Green Revolution and denounce them as the destructive forces of science
and business, and they conclude that environmentally destructive monocul-
ture practices must be part of the capitalist logic. Yet, as highlighted in the
case of the documentary of Erwin Wagenhofer, these undesirable side-effects
are a result of too little rather than too much private sector involvement. For
example, public sector researchers based at CGIARs did not have to bother
much about the real and complex set of problems that farmer face in the ﬁeld
or the particular consumer taste of different cultures. They could just focus
on plant variety traits that would increase yields and then select the elite vari-
eties and hand them over to national agencies for distribution. As a result, the
private sector may have had little interest in investing in the development and
commercialization of new varieties in developing countries and in compet-
ing with the public sector, which would distribute the seeds almost for free.
Thus, the private sector largely stayed out of the Green Revolution. This ex-
plains, for example, why the greatest bottleneck in many developing countries
is probably the absence of a local seed industry. It also explains why many
Filipino consumers prefer to buy rice from Thailand, which is the greatest
exporter of high-quality Indica Rice, but actually never embraced the large-
scale adoption of high-yielding rice varieties. They say it simply tastes better
than the rice varieties that were bred by the International Rice Research Insti-
tute (IRRI) and widely adopted by Filipino farmers [22].
4.6
International Agricultural Research After the Cold War
After the end of the Cold War, foreign aid was cut in almost all state bud-
gets of developed countries [24] and public sector funding for international
agricultural research decreased signiﬁcantly. Right-wing politicians argued
that there was no need for further investment in CGIAR research because
the Green Revolution has already largely achieved its purpose of eliminating
hunger. This argument is quite cynical considering the fact that there are still
over 800 million people worldwide suffering from hunger and malnutrition.
Left-wing politicians, in turn, were using the familiar but ﬂawed argument
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to the conclusion that there is no further need for investment in technology
but instead just a need to bring the food to the poor. Agricultural ministries
in developed countries that still do not know how to get rid of production sur-
pluses would most certainly welcome the idea. Yet, the fatal consequences of
such dumping policies are widely known: local farmers in developing coun-
tries that cannot compete with donated food are forced to abandon farming
because of lack of revenues. Thus, such policies are likely to worsen food
self-sufﬁciency and increase dependence on Western food aid.
Even though the “distribution problem” argument is still widely used by
teachers in high-schools, it is rejected even by left-leaning development ac-
tivists who now embrace the paradigm that farmers in developing countries
need to be assisted in growing their own food in a sustainable way. Yet, the
problem with Western non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that pursue
this approach in developing countries is that they generally dismiss the role
that business and new technologies have in agricultural development, argu-
ing that it would introduce a capitalist logic that is not compatible with local
traditions. They believe that farmers should rely on their traditional low-
input and low-tech practices. They may assist them in ﬁnding slightly better
techniques of soil fertility and integrated pest management but, in general,
farmers are encouraged to use the agricultural practices they would use any-
way. Subsequently, these Western NGOs help them to export the harvested
agricultural products to developed countries where they are sold under dif-
ferent kinds of environmental and social labeling schemes. Such a strategy
resembles the top–down approach of the Green Revolution.
Both strategies assume that there is a sort of market failure because busi-
ness does not care about the poor. This would produce negative externalities
such as increasing social inequality, hunger, and malnutrition that must be
addressed by responsible Westerners. The only difference is that one ap-
proach looks at modern technology as the solution whereas the other ap-
proach sees it as the main problem. However, the ideological mindset of
anti-technology NGOs is likely to harm poor farmers in developing countries
more than the previous overemphasis on public sector R&D. Farmers need
to become actively involved in the process of technological change and they
need to learn how to take advantage of the emerging knowledge economy.
This will eventually lead to more self-conﬁdence and entrepreneurship and
result in increases in agricultural productivity and nutritional quality of the
traditional food crops. This is especially true for Africa, which did not beneﬁt
from the ﬁrst Green Revolution.
It is often argued that local entrepreneurship in developing countries
is hampered by the absence of land titles in the informal sector. Yet it
is still unclear whether the assignment of land titles effectively results in
more entrepreneurial activity independently of the other local circumstances.
More important is the creation of an entrepreneurial infrastructure that low-
ers local market transaction costs and opens access to new markets. Local84 P. Aerni
entrepreneurs can further be encouraged to become low-tech innovators
through the establishment of petty patent systems [25].
In 2001, the UNDP Human Development Report was titled Making new
technologies work for human development [26]. It attempted to counteract the
misconception of the supposedly negative role of technology and the private
sector in sustainable development and was promptly attacked by sustainable
development activists. This is a pity because this report merely reminded
policy-decision makers that there is Principle 12 in the UNCED Rio Declara-
tion, which emphasizes the important role of new technologies in sustainable
development.
It seems that neither agricultural economists that helped shape the Green
Revolution, nor Western NGO leaders that advocate participatory approaches
in agricultural development can see any beneﬁt in getting the private sector
more involved in agriculturaldevelopment and encourage localentrepreneur-
ship. This may be related to the fact that they tend to use theoretical concepts
that might have looked reasonable in the Cold War economy, but they are
rather outdated in the new knowledge economy.
5
The New Knowledge Economy and the New Rules of the Game
The two major driving forces of the new knowledge economy are the rev-
olutions in information technology and biotechnology that took off in the
1970s and 1980s. Both revolutions started initially at universities and were
strongly supported by the public sector. However, when the ﬁrst prototypes of
commercial interest emerged, the university-based inventors decided to seek
intellectual property protection for their inventions in order to set up their
own businesses in the form of spin-off ﬁrms. Some of them eventually es-
tablished highly successful multinational companies themselves, others were
able to partner with multinationals in the commercialization of the technol-
ogy, others focused on licensing out their patented technology to whoever
was interested in using it, and others simply lost out to entrepreneurial young
outsiders that quickly grasped the economic potential of certain clumsy pro-
totypes and improved them to a level where they could become commercial
successes [27].
Both, the IT industry and the biotechnology industry have matured over
the past decade. As a consequence, the costs of IT and biotechnology prod-
ucts and tools have decreased signiﬁcantly and are now reaching a far wider
customer base. Unlike in the old economy where most developing countries
merely played the role of suppliers of primary commodities and lacked the
critical base of domestic human capital to make use of modern technology to
develop their homegrown technologies, the new knowledge economy allows
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5.1
Effects of Information and Communication Technologies
Thanks to all the new communication and information technologies, new
knowledge spreads more quickly and widely, international research networks
become much more extensive and effective, outsourcing business activities
from simple accounting to R&D has become an integral part of the strate-
gies of multinational companies, and global venture capital is increasingly
invested in talented techno-entrepreneurs in developing countries. The re-
sulting rise of many developing countries in science, culture, business, and
political power makes the jargon of the North–South dialogue of many West-
ern development activists look increasingly old-fashioned. South–South busi-
ness investments and research collaborations are growing ﬁve times as fast
as their North–South equivalents [28]. Moreover, many big companies in the
South are starting to even gobble up companies in Europe and the USA.
5.2
Effects of the New Tools of Biotechnology
There is a widespread prediction that the biotechnology revolution, pow-
ered also by the information technology revolution, will eventually transform
a rather dirty agrochemical and petrochemical industry into a cleaner biol-
ogy industry [29]. The potential economic, social, and environmental welfare
beneﬁts of this transformation are enormous, and this time it is likely that de-
veloping countries with a critical domestic knowledge base will be at the fore-
front of new product developments. If mankind is serious about protecting
the natural environment and ensuring access to food, thegrowingdemand for
foodover the next 50 years should not be met by further colonizingof pristine
ecosystems but rather by raising productivity on existing farmland. Agricul-
tural biotechnology is not just ideally positioned to meet this challenge but
also likely to produce new food products that are safer, more nutritious, and
tastier. The potential environmental and health risks of biotechnology must
be taken seriously, but after 10 years of experience and innumerable public
risk assessment studies there is no indication that existing GM crops pose any
risks that go beyond the risks known from conventional crops. Moreover, the
ethical concerns raised about the current techniques of genetic engineering
could quickly be overturned by the emergence of completely new transform-
ation techniques and the advancements in genomic research. But, one ethical
concern will certainly not go away and that is the crucial aspect of social
equity.
The private-sector-driven biotechnology revolution may result in enor-
mous social inequalities because the least developed countries that have
simply no means, no critical knowledge base, and no attractive markets to
participate in this emerging sector may once again be left out. As a result, the86 P. Aerni
new products would merely improve the needs of afﬂuent societies that can
promise a high return on investment while the basic needs of the poor remain
unaddressed.
5.3
Management of Public Goods in the New Knowledge Economy
As mentioned earlier, an exponential increase in knowledge leads to an expo-
nential increase of the probability that new products and services will come
into being. These new goods and services generate innumerable new Dupuit
welfare triangles - but only for those societies that do not discourage their
introduction and those that have sufﬁcient purchasing power and market
size to attract them. Therefore, there is a high likelihood that the knowledge
economy will increase global inequality unless national governments and
international organizations design policies that ensure that the new technolo-
gies will also beneﬁt and eventually empower people in the least developed
countries.
However, it would be a mistake to address the challenge by simply embrac-
ing a second Green Revolution because, as explained above, the underlying
principles of welfare economics are no longer applicable to the rules of the
new knowledge economy.
The belief that public goods should be provided exclusively by the public
sector ignores the fact that the private sector increasingly contributes to the
production of public goods (e.g., clean technologies, more efﬁcient use of nat-
ural resources) [30]. The public sector should therefore not assume tasks that
the private sector might provide in a more efﬁcient way and in better qual-
ity (more focused on consumer/client needs) but should learn how to better
play the role of a facilitator of private sector activities that generate large
Dupuit welfare triangles. As shown in Sect. 1, the generation of these social
welfare triangles requires high ﬁxed costs that are spent on large investment
in R&D, physical infrastructure, and product development. Companies are of-
ten unwilling to invest such high ﬁxed costsin the development of a new good
unless the resulting market is expected to be proﬁtable. This also explains
why the ﬁrst prototypes of new technologies were almost always designed in
university rather than in corporate laboratories [31].
Throughout the history of technology we can always observe the same
pattern: there is the curiosity-driven researcher funded by the public sec-
tor who has no immediate interest in business. But, there is also the bold
entrepreneur who uses the knowledge generated by the curiosity-driven re-
searcher to design a new prototype that is patentable. The prototype is sub-
sequently adjusted to market needs, and ﬁnally commercialized on a large
scale. Both characters, the inventive researcher and the entrepreneur, are
needed to create social welfare triangles. Sometimes the curiosity-driven
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son. But often the inventor is not necessarily a good entrepreneur and the
good entrepreneur is not necessarily good at inventing. Anyway, without the
entrepreneur who is primarily focused on creating a new market and mak-
ing large proﬁts as a temporary monopolist, the fruits of science would never
become real.
This is one of the most important insights, and it was ignored during the
Green Revolution when research, product development, and distribution of
new agricultural technologies was entirely managed by the public sector. The
private sector is simply better at converting knowledge into useful goods and
services. The public sector should mobilize this strength of the private sector
for the management of public goods rather than try to duplicate it.
Today it is important that the public sector ﬁrst identiﬁes a list of biotech-
nology products that could potentially generate large social and environmen-
tal welfare beneﬁts (e.g., biofuel generated from cellulose, drugs for diseases
that are extremely rare, vaccines that protect people fromsudden outbreaks of
communicable diseases). It should then offer university research teams fund-
ing to develop a ﬁrst prototype of such a new product. At the same time, it
could offer a generous award to the research team that ﬁrst develops a de-
pendable prototype that is sufﬁciently attractive to be licensed out to the
private sector. Yet, it should not be the university but the government that
does the licensing negotiations because it would otherwise just increase the
costs of patent lawyers at universities and distract researchers from what they
do best, namely research and development.
This would not prevent researchers from becoming entrepreneurs them-
selves. In this case the technology patent would not be licensed out but used
as the ﬁrst asset of a new spin-off ﬁrm. The researcher would then entirely as-
sume the role of an entrepreneur, who must ensure that the product can be
s o l do nt h em a r k e ta tap r o ﬁ t a b l ep r i c e .
Often the private sector is discouraged from using a new prototype be-
cause inexperienced researchers overestimate the value of their invention and
underestimate the ﬁxed costs and risks that companies face when commer-
cializing a new technology with uncertain market potential. The government
that initiated the research initiative to achieve certain social and environmen-
tal objectives may have a real interest in encouraging the private sector to use
the prototype and convert it into new goods and new markets. The govern-
ment might therefore be willing to forego the licensing fee entirely in return
for certain reservations when it comes to the commercialization of the prod-
uct. It could ensure that there is ongoing research collaboration between the
ﬁrm and the university and that the new products are affordable to the poor
in developing countries (which may still be proﬁtable for the company if it
is free to charge a higher price in developed countries and able to prevent
parallel imports).
If the prototype is still not attractive to the private sector because the
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incentives such as fast track regulatory approval and tax credits for product
research. Once the private sector is willing to embrace the product because it
expects to make a proﬁt thanks to the additional incentives, it will be much
more efﬁcient and more end-user responsive than the public sector could
possibly be.
5.4
Global Governance to Produce Global Public Goods
Often governments in developing countries may not have the means to offer
sufﬁcient incentives on their own to induce companies or research institutes
to come up with products that would produce high social welfare triangles
for their country. For example, improved orphan crops could save thousands
of lives and signiﬁcantly improve the health of the poor, but neither the local
private sector nor the national governments in developing countries have the
means and the know-how to successfully invest in such improvements. At the
same time, multinational companies might have the know-how but do not
have an incentive to invest (due the small market size for the goodand the low
purchasing power).
International donors could address these constraints by creating incentives
f o rt h ep r i v a t es e c t o rt op r o d u c es u c hg o o d sb yo f f e r i n gag e n e r o u sp r i z e
f o rt h eﬁ r s tc o m p a n yo rr e s e a r c ho r g a n i z a t i o nt h a tw a sa b l et op r o d u c es u c h
a good [32] or contract an advance purchase that would boost expected de-
mand [33].
Some people would denounce this as creeping privatization but the fact
is that the new technologies that were derived from the information and
biotechnology revolutions make it increasingly cost-effective to include the
private sector in the management of public goods. Generally, these technolo-
gies permit smaller producers and more scope for competition [30].
5.5
Future Role of CGIARs in Promoting Agricultural Biotechnology
in Developing Countries
From 1996 to 2004, biotechnology crops have reduced the volume of pesticide
spraying globally by 6%, equivalent to a decrease of 172500t. The technol-
ogy has also signiﬁcantly reduced the release of greenhouse gas emissions
from agriculture; a reduction equivalent to removing 5 million cars from the
roads [34]. The increase in farm income that resulted from the adoption of
GM crops is equivalent to adding 3–4%t ot h ev a l u eo fg l o b a lp r o d u c t i o no f
the four main biotechnology crops [34]. Moreover the adoption of Bt cotton
in many different developing countries turned out to have signiﬁcant eco-
nomic, health, and environmental beneﬁts for small- and large-scale farmers
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count the large economic and environmental gains that have been achieved
by using all the other tools of modern biotechnology such as tissue culture,
marker-assisted breeding, gene silencing, and genome mapping.
But why then do politicians often argue that agricultural biotechnol-
ogy does not offer any beneﬁts to society and the environment? This may
be largely based on a generally hostile public opinion and vested interests
that prefer the status quo in agriculture. Yet, it also seems that agricultural
economists are not really able to provide convincing arguments about why
agricultural biotechnology will also beneﬁt the poor and the environment.
Agricultural economists, who still stick to the principles of neoclassical wel-
fare economics, assume that the private sector has, once again, no interest in
addressing the needs of the poor and that therefore the public sector needs to
step in and initiate a new public-sector-driven Green Revolution [36,37]. The
skepticism about private-sector involvement may be related to the general
distrust of monopolistic competition that drives the process of technological
innovation. In agriculture, it adds to the already existing scepticism related
to the agricultural treadmill hypothesis, which treats technology as exoge-
nous and implies that beneﬁts from introducing technology in agriculture
would not go to farmers but primarily to the seed and agrochemical industry
and to the food consumers. This clearly contradicts the numbers of Brookes
and Barfoot [34], who calculated an increase in global farm income through
the adoption of GM crops of a cumulative total of $27 billion for the period
1996–2004, derived from a combination of enhanced productivity and efﬁ-
ciency gains. Obviously agricultural biotechnology must be more than just
an agricultural treadmill. Moreover, it is wrong to reduce farmers to passive
price-takers who struggle to survive in perfect competition. Farmers were al-
ways innovators and interested in collaborating with researchers; but national
agricultural policies can either encourage or discourage innovative farmer
activities.
5.6
Farmers as Innovators
The land grant college system in the USA was set up in the nineteenth
century with the purpose of promoting applied science and stimulating eco-
nomic activities in the rural areas. The state universities, which were estab-
lished all over the country, had the explicit mandate to cooperate with local
farmers and support their efforts in ﬁnding solutions to speciﬁc crop prob-
lems, but also to develop agricultural innovations with a commercial poten-
tial. This collaboration produced technological innovations, new agricultural
products, and new companies in agribusiness. Apart from stimulating eco-
nomic growth it also contributed to the social empowerment of rural areas
in the USA. A similar development happened in Switzerland at the end of
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speciﬁc emphasis on improvement agricultural research and development
and, in 1898, national agricultural research institutes were set up to meet
this challenge [15].
This successful partnership between the university researcher and the
farmer has largely been abandoned in Europe and the USA but New Zealand
started to rediscover this success story after it decided to liberalize agricul-
ture in the 1980s. The Royal Institutes of New Zealand were semi-privatized
and its agricultural research activities only get funding if committed to mak-
ing the farming sector more competitive and sustainable through innovation.
This implies a close collaboration with business and the farming community.
Even though genetically engineered crops are not yet approved for commer-
cialization, agricultural biotechnology is at the center of this new agricultural
policy in New Zealand. New Zealand’s biotechnology industry generated an
estimated revenue of NZ$811 million in 2005, with over NZ$250 million in
exports (for further information see [38]). The industry has helped ensure
the continued international competitiveness and efﬁciency of New Zealand’s
food and beverage sector. This focus on technological innovation did not just
create a more sustainable and competitive agricultural sector (compared to
the previous subsidy-based agricultural system) but also boosted the farm-
ers self-conﬁdence. Farmers do not feel victims of a new knowledge-based
economy but an integral part of it [39]. The agricultural treadmill would have
predicted a different outcome.
5.7
Crop Research Networks as a New Form
of International Agricultural Research
Some would argue that New Zealand is an exception. It has invested a lot in
knowledge and human capital, is well-governed, has excellent infrastructure
and highly developed input and ﬁnancial markets. Poor developing countries
where none of this applies would face a much bigger challenge to make tech-
nology compatible with sustainable development, especially when it comes
to the improvement of orphan crops that are largely grown by subsistence
farmers. These farmers would ﬁrst of all not beneﬁt from private-sector inno-
vations because there is no incentive to invest and, if they did invest, farmers
would lack the knowledge to use new technology in a sustainable way.
The arguments may sound reasonable but they underestimate the power of
creative solutions.
The Cassava Biotechnology Network (CBN), which started in 1988 as
a global initiative to mobilize the development and application of biotechnol-
ogy tools for the improvement of cassava agriculture, is an excellent example
to illustrate how creative thinking can employ agricultural biotechnology for
the beneﬁt and empowerment of local subsistence farmers. Cassava is a typ-
ical orphan crop that is produced mostly by smallholders on marginal andAgricultural Biotechnology and the Knowledge Economy 91
submarginal lands in the humid and subhumid tropics. It is a starchy root
crop that grows in a wide range of environments and is very tolerant to
drought and acidic soils. Cassava has the advantage of ﬂexible harvesting (the
root tuber can be preserved in the soil for up to one year) and this makes it
the crop of last resort for many poor farmers that prefer to harvest cassava
whenever there is a shortage of food or animal feed.
CBN is based at the Centro International de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT)
in Colombia and consists of a loose network of stakeholders that represent
cassava research, cassava farming, cassava business, and international donors
with an interest in cassava agriculture. The triennial CBN meetings serve as
the major platformofinformation exchange. The aims are toshare knowledge
on cassava, identify new challenges in research, improve farmer adoption and
marketing of cassava, and set up new research collaborations that are focused
not primarily on research but on the development of new and useful prod-
ucts for cassava farmers. CIAT, which belongs to CGIAR research centers that
were set up during the Cold War, is the major driving force behind this net-
work. It responded to the ﬁnancial crisis of the CGIAR system in the 1990s
by basically reinventing itself as an engine of innovation in the area of or-
phan crops. CIAT realized that the old supply-driven system of international
agricultural research was not really addressing the needs of the end-users and
treated them in a rather paternalist way. It was a purely public sector initia-
tive, which may be able to sponsor excellent research but does not know how
to make useful products and disseminate them efﬁciently.
One goal of CIAT was therefore to get more involvement of the private
sector and farmers to ﬁnd out more about the effective demand for certain
innovations in cassava agriculture. Once they have identiﬁed the areas of re-
search that would meet the biggest demand, they look for the best partners
worldwide to collaborate on joint research projects. Thanks to the advances
in modern information and communication technologies, international re-
search collaborations have become much cheaper and also more effective.
This also explains why crop research networks such as CBN are probably
best placed to facilitate an efﬁcient exchange of knowledge and experience
in the area of cassava research, production, and marketing worldwide. The
interesting thing is that it is not just the development community but also
the private sector and advanced research institutes in developed countries
that have an interest in participating in such networks and in learning more
about the advances in cassava science, the opportunities to create new mar-
kets out of cassava innovations, and ways to stimulate consumer demand for
this neglected crop. Unsurprisingly, the fundraising activities for certain joint
projects are not limited to the mainstream ofﬁcial donor community but also
include the private sector and governments in developing countries. In fact,
two thirds of the members of the CBN are from developing countries. This
indicates that South–South technology transfer initiatives may eventually be-
come as important as North–South technology transfer [40].92 P. Aerni
5.8
Agricultural Biotechnology as a Tool of Empowerment:
The Case of the Cassava Biotechnology Network (CBN)
CBN is primarily designed to improve cassava as a food crop. Cassava is ef-
ﬁcient in carbohydrate production but has a very low protein content. This
causes a major problem of malnutrition if there is a high dependence on
cassava-based daily meals. Agricultural biotechnologyproved able to enhance
the protein content of cassava [41] and was also used to analyze the biochem-
ical pathways of β-carotene-rich cassava cultivated by indigenous tribes in the
Amazon [42].
Another problem of food security is the creeping genetic erosion of cas-
sava, which results in ever decreasing yields. Cassava is a vegetatively prop-
agated crop and the planting material must therefore be exchanged in the
form of cassava stakes rather than seed. Stakes are often highly contaminated
with viruses and affected by genetic erosion. These problems largely account
for the very low yields that cassava subsistence farmers reach in the ﬁeld.
Tissue culture techniques, some of the earliest tools of agricultural biotech-
nology, proved to be an excellent solution to address this problem. They allow
the cheap and effective reproduction of clean cassava stakes. Moreover, tis-
sue culture technology has been constantly improved over the past decades
and the price of a tissue culture laboratory has dropped signiﬁcantly over
the past years. CIAT’s BiotechnologyResearch Unit (BRU) has developed low-
cost cassava in-vitro rapid multiplication techniques in collaboration with
a Colombian farmer organization called FIDAR (Fundcación para la Investi-
gación y Desarollo Agrícola). This comprises small tissue culture laboratories,
cold chambers, and greenhouses, built mostly with local material. The use
of local material made the end product six times cheaper than the ofﬁ-
cial market version. Subsequently, men and women were trained to learn
how to use their traditional knowledge about the best local cassava varieties
and reproduce them in a tissue culture laboratory. The project proved to be
very successful and induced especially women to set up local businesses and
specialize in the local selling of high quality cassava stakes. In interviews con-
ducted in 2003 with these women it was striking how this project also boosted
their self-conﬁdence. Suddenly, high technologyceased to be a magic practice
that could only be handled by Western scientists but became a practical tool
in daily life. It proveshowthe value of indigenous knowledge canbe enhanced
through the application of the new tools of agricultural biotechnology; and it
shows that agricultural biotechnology can be a tool of empowerment [40].
CBN is, however, not just promoting cassava as a food crop but also as
a cash crop. This is because cassava as a food crop hardly generates new mar-
kets as long as it only serves the immediate needs of those who produce it.
Moreover, any production surplus that exceeds the demand of the family of
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of the absence of markets. The absence of markets is largely related to in-
frastructure problems and the lack of entrepreneurs who are interested in
developing a market for cassava. Agricultural biotechnologyhas a potential to
stimulate the development of new cassava markets by designing cassava vari-
eties that are more productive and taste better. Moreover, the new techniques
of agricultural biotechnology also have the potential to accelerate the bulking
process of cassava, prevent its quick postharvest deterioration, and shorten
the time of effective fermentation (detoxiﬁcation). This would deﬁnitely help
to overcome some of the constraints on cassava trade and attract more local
entrepreneurs [40].
Most of the ongoing CBN research projects designed to make cassava
a more attractive cash crop and increase consumer demand through better
marketing are in collaboration with partners in the private sector. CBN is not
interested in giving its product innovation away for free but wants the farmer
to pay a price he can afford so that he learns to appreciate the value of in-
novation. The farmer’s willingness to buy also signals that there is an actual
demand for the product. Moreover, it changes the farmer’s attitude: he is now
taken seriously as a businessman and is not just a mere receiver of charity
products.
All in all, the CBN projects prove that CGIARs can very well play a new
role as brokers of new public–private partnership projects for the beneﬁt of
t h o s ew h oa r em o s tv u l n e r a b l ei nt h ek n o w l e d g ee c o n o m y .C B Nc o u l db es t i l l
more successful if the Europeans could ﬁnally overcome their mental barrier
towards agricultural biotechnology and support this success story.
6
Final Remarks
Current economic analysis of the value of agricultural biotechnology is still
weighing the risks and beneﬁts of existing GM crops for farmers and con-
sumers. Even though, as shown in thisarticle, these economic analyses largely
conﬁrm the economic and environmental beneﬁts of existing GM crops, they
largely ignore the fact that agricultural biotechnology advances at an un-
precedented speed, continuously improving the economic and environmental
performance ofexisting agro-biotechnologyproducts andsubstituting earlier
agrochemical products with new and cleaner biotechnology-based products.
The value of this constant introduction of new goods into the economy is
ignored by comparative–static welfare economics because the associated gen-
eral and partial equilibrium models assume that all goods that could possibly
exist do already exist. The fatal consequence is that the social welfare pro-
duced through the introduction of new goods is simply ignored. Welfare
economics and agricultural economics in particular are therefore too much
focused on the potential risks of new technologies and underestimate the94 P. Aerni
beneﬁts for society at large. The assumption of a comparative–static econ-
omy is especially ﬂawed in the new knowledge economy where an exponential
growth of knowledge leads to an exponential increase of the probability that
new goods come into being. This largely explains why national agricultural
policies that still rely on the principles of classical welfare economics have
largely discouraged farmers from becoming more competitive and innova-
tive (e.g., in Europe) while new policies that have embraced the ideas of new
growth theory are encouraging farmers to become innovative and compet-
itive (e.g., in New Zealand). New growth theory policies also proved to be
more effective in improving the environment and social welfare.
If new technologies are not only to serve the attractive markets in afﬂuent
societies but also to contribute to a better life in poor developing countries, it
is time to learn from past mistakes and also to design new development poli-
cies that take into account bottom–up solutions. As shown in the case of the
Cassava Biotechnology Network (CBN), agricultural biotechnology proved
to be perfectly compatible with such bottom–up solutions that involve the
local farmers as well as the local private sector. Moreover, modern infor-
mation and communication technologies offer new forms of decentralized
international collaboration that enable a stronger involvement of local par-
t i c i p a n t sa n dam o r ee f f e c t i v ei n t e r n a t i o n a ln e t w o r ko fr e s e a r c ha n dp r o d u c t
development. In this context, CBN represents another example of a new ap-
proach that is no longer based on the old principles of welfare economics
but has embraced new growth theory and thus enabled the marginal farmers
in developing countries to participate more effectively in the new knowledge
economy.
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